Political discourse in football coverage : the cases of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana

Football coverage in newspapers is both an arena for and a mirror of political discourse within a society. The paper argues that discourses within football coverage referring to political issues reflect dominant – and, possibly, contesting – “truths”, which themselves are linked to power relations and political struggles within a given society. The comparison of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, two neighbouring countries in very different conditions (particularly with regard to their historical trajectories and the degree of societal consensus), and more particularly, the comparison of dominant discourses on the topics of patriotism, peace and good governance related to the World Cup qualification of both national teams supports the hypothesis of a strong context-relatedness of a politically loaded “football language”. For instance, whereas in Ghana patriotism is, when football comes in, quickly merged with pan-africanism, the Ivorian team renewed the heated political debate about “Ivorianess” by putting forward a notion of inclusive patriotism.Die Fußball-Berichterstattung in Zeitungen stellt eine Arena, aber auch einen Spiegel der politischen Diskurse innerhalb von Gesellschaften dar. Der vorliegende Text argumentiert, dass Sportberichte dominante, aber auch Gegen-“Wahrheiten” reflektieren, die in Verbindung zu Herrschaftsbeziehungen und politischen Auseinandersetzungen in einer bestimmten Gesellschaft stehen. Der Vergleich von Côte d’Ivoire und Ghana, Nachbarstaaten in sehr unterschiedlichem aktuellen Kontext (im Hinblick auf den Verlauf der jüngeren Geschichte und in der Ausprägung von gesellschaftlichem Konsens), und im besonderen der Vergleich von prägenden Diskursen zu den Themen Patriotismus, Frieden und Good Governance in der Berichterstattung über Qualifikation zur sowie Leistung bei der Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft 2006 durch beide Nationalmannschaften stützt die Hypothese einer starken Kontextgebundenheit der politisch aufgeladenen „Fußballsprache“. Während in Ghana beispielsweise Patriotismus schnell mit „Panafrikanismus“ gepaart wird, sobald von Fußball die Rede ist, hat das ivorische Team die politisch hitzig geführte Debatte über die „Ivoirité“ weiterentwickelt, indem eine inklusivere Form des Patriotismus breite Unterstützung findet

The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic

Little attention has been paid to the factual effect of the state’s security forces on the security of African citizens. Reports about security forces’ contribution to widespread insecurity are frequent: the protectors become violators and their appearance causes fear, not security. In many African crisis countries the realization of better security forces appears to be an elusive goal, either because violent conflicts are not definitively settled and therefore do not allow for decent reform or because a lack of capacity as a result of material constraints is not easy to remedy. The self-help mechanisms used to compensate for the lack of state-sponsored security need more attention. However, it has to be acknowledged that the ideal of a neutral and effective force loyal to the state is shared by a great majority of the population. This contribution compares the experiences of Liberia and the Central African Republic, two extreme cases of strong and weak international involvement, respectively, in post-conflict security-sector reform.Liberia, Central African Republic, security, armed forces, security-sector reform

Not Always in the People’s Interest: Power-sharing Arrangements in African Peace Agreements

Peace agreements form a crucial element of strategies to bring security from outside: they involve third-party mediators during the negotiation stage and often peacekeeping troops to guarantee the agreement at an implementation stage. Peace roundtables usually involve top politicians and military leaders, who negotiate, sign, and/or benefit from the agreement. What is usually and conspicuously absent from peace negotiations is broad-based participation by those who should benefit in the first place: citizens. More specifically, the local level of security provision and insecurity production is rarely taken into account. This paper reviews parts of the academic debate on power sharing and war termination, touching on some key findings by the main researchers working on the topic. The ambivalent African experience with Arend Lijphart’s four main ingredients of consociational democracy (grand coalition, minority veto, proportional representation, group autonomy) is summarized. Recent major African peace agreements (1999-2007) are analyzed, and their power-sharing content detailed. Most agreements contain some—though varying— power-sharing devices. Most striking is the variation regarding the important question of who is sharing power with whom. Obviously, only those present at the negotiation table can really count on being included in major ways. Finally, three country cases are analyzed over a longer time period: Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007), Liberia (1994-2003), and Central African Republic (1996-2007). The conclusion focuses on the factors of failure of peace agreements that place a heavy emphasis on power sharing.Power sharing, peace agreements, consociational democracy, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia

Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation

This paper analyzes the declining importance of political parties in the Central African Republic (CAR). It argues that the problematic attitude of elites who are fluctuating between violent and peaceful behavior in order to further their own careers is jeopardizing both peace and democracy. The author hypothesizes that both political parties and rebel movements are failing to adequately represent (ethnoregional) interests, but that parties are suffering more in the course of the enduring war and the peace process. Patterns of elite behavior are presented as the main explanation for the resulting crisis of representation, with international actors’ preference for inclusionary power-sharing deals seen as the main aggravating factor.Central African Republic, peace process, political parties, rebel movements,representation

Major Flaws in Conflict Prevention Policies towards Africa. The Conceptual Deficits of International Actors’ Approaches and How to Overcome Them

Current thinking on African conflicts suffers from misinterpretations (oversimplification, lack of focus, lack of conceptual clarity, state-centrism and lack of vision). The paper analyses a variety of the dominant explanations of major international actors and donors, showing how these frequently do not distinguish with sufficient clarity between the ‘root causes’ of a conflict, its aggravating factors and its triggers. Specifically, a correct assessment of conflict prolonging (or sustaining) factors is of vital importance in Africa’s lingering confrontations. Broader approaches (e.g. “structural stability”) offer a better analytical framework than familiar one-dimensional explanations. Moreover, for explaining and dealing with violent conflicts a shift of attention from the nation-state towards the local and sub-regional level is needed.Sub-Saharan Africa, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Factors, Root causes, Conflict Prolonging Factors, Escalation Patterns, Peace Order, Structural Stability

Reshaping Political Space? The Impact of the Armed Insurgency in the Central African Republic on Political Parties and Representation

This paper analyzes the declining importance of political parties in the Central African Republic (CAR). It argues that the problematic attitude of elites who are fluctuating between violent and peaceful behavior in order to further their own careers is jeopardizing both peace and democracy. The author hypothesizes that both political parties and rebel movements are failing to adequately represent (ethnoregional) interests, but that parties are suffering more in the course of the enduring war and the peace process. Patterns of elite behavior are presented as the main explanation for the resulting crisis of representation, with international actors’ preference for inclusionary power‐sharing deals seen as the main aggravating factor.Umgestaltung des politischen Raums? Die Auswirkungen der bewaffneten Rebellion auf politische Parteien und Repräsentation in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik Dieses Diskussionspaper analysiert die schwindende Bedeutung politischer Parteien in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik. Argumentiert wird, dass das problematische Verhalten der Eliten, die zwischen gewaltsamen und friedlichen Handlungsweisen hin und her wechseln, um ihre eigene Karriere zu befördern, letztlich Frieden und Demokratie gefährdet. Der Autor stellt die Hypothese auf, dass sowohl politische Parteien als auch Rebellenbewegungen darin versagen, (ethnoregionale) Interessen adäquat zu repräsentieren. Allerdings leiden Parteien deutlich stärker im Verlauf des Kriegs‐ und Friedensprozesses. Verhaltensmuster der Elite werden als wesentliche Erklärung für die daraus resultierende Krise der Repräsentation dargestellt, während die Präferenz internationaler Akteure für inklusive Machtteilungsarrangements als hauptsächlicher verschärfender Faktor angesehen wird

Major Flaws in Conflict Prevention Policies towards Africa. The Conceptual Deficits of International Actors’ Approaches and How to Overcome Them

Current thinking on African conflicts suffers from misinterpretations (oversimplification, lack of focus, lack of conceptual clarity, state- centrism and lack of vision). The paper analyses a variety of the dominant explanations of major international actors and donors, showing how these frequently do not distinguish with sufficient clarity between the ‘root causes’ of a conflict, its aggravating factors and its triggers. Specifically, a correct assessment of conflict prolonging (or sustaining) factors is of vital importance in Africa’s lingering confrontations. Broader approaches (e.g. “structural stability”) offer a better analytical framework than familiar one-dimensional explanations. Moreover, for explaining and dealing with violent conflicts a shift of attention from the nation-state towards the local and sub-regional level is needed.Saharan Africa, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Factors, Root causes, Conflict Prolonging Factors, Escalation Patterns, Peace Order, Structural Stability

Peace and power sharing in Africa: a not so obvious relationship

Peace accords usually involve top politicians and military leaders, who negotiate, sign, and/or benefit from an agreement. What is conspicuously absent from such negotiations is broad-based participation by those who should benefit in the first place: citizens. More specifically, the local level of security provision and insecurity production is rarely taken into account. The analysis of recent African peace agreements shows important variations in power-sharing devices and why it is important to ask who is sharing power with whom. Experiences with power sharing are mixed and far less positive than assumed by outside negotiators

Why security forces do not deliver security: evidence from Liberia and the Central African Republic

Little attention has been paid to the factual contribution of the state’s security forces to the physical security of African citizens. Reports about security forces adding to a widespread insecurity are frequent: the protectors become violators, and their appearance causes fear, not security. In many African crisis countries the realization of better security forces appears to be an elusive goal, either because violent conflicts are not definitively settled and therefore do not allow for decent reform or because a lack of capacity as a result of material constraints is not easy to remedy. Above all, the political will of governments to reform their security forces, including their composition and structure, is often limited. This contribution compares the security provision by official forces in Liberia and the Central African Republic, two extreme cases of strong and weak international involvement, respectively, in postconflict security-sector reform. Blueprint models for such reforms that do not take into account local expectations and experiences are bound to fail

Peace through constitutional amendment? Opportunities and tendencies

On 9 July 2011 the validity of Sudan's interim constitution will end and South Sudan will be independent as determined per referendum. For five years, the constitution has contributed to a significant decrease in violence between the government and South Sudanese rebels (while war has been rampaging in the province of Darfur). The events in South Sudan could be paradigmatic for the fact that opportunities for a policy of peace by means of constitutional amendments are often missed. Constitutional amendments offer an extensive range of possibilities for exerting influence on ethnically or otherwise divided societies. However, this potential is rarely put to use. The constitutional determination of the form of government, the main rules for decision-making and minority rights should be particularly binding for all former warring parties. Constitutional amendments and peace agreements in intra-state conflicts form a complex relationship to one another. Constitutional amendments do not always follow peace agreements. Peace processes and processes of constitutional reform are often long and multipartite. Between 2005 and 2010, there were only four countries (Burundi, Iraq, Nepal, Sudan) in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the MENA region with divided societies where a peace agreement and a significant constitutional amendment that affected the root causes of the conflict occurred. Nevertheless, other cases in which constitutional amendments are either a) used as prevention against conflicts or b) can be seen as lessons learned from long-lasting tensions (Bolivia, Ecuador, Kenya, Zanzibar/Tanzania) exist